Barack Obama held a town hall in Berlin recently. [As an aside, his intelligence and oration are such a refreshing contrast to POTUS DJT.] Part of his answer to a question was (~20:10):
[in a democracy]... you never get 100% of what you want...
So far as it goes, this is true. But there also seems to be the presumption that what the consensus agrees to is the 'right' or 'best' answer... what if it's not? The political consensus on nuclear weapons had the U.S. build and stockpile thousands of nuclear warheads, enough to push the entire planet into nuclear winter several times over. And the slow pace of political solutions to climate change would see the likely decimation of the human population due to wars, famines and disease brought about by climate disruption before a 'political' solution is considered.
This reminds me much of the dangers of agricultural monoculturing, when corporate commercial farming grows only the most productive/mechanization friendly strain of any single crop and through their neglect, lose the genetic diversity of less 'useful' strains. Small farms will grow other strains for other reasons (flavor, growth conditions, resistance, etc.). Monoculturing only preserves the information of one strain while the vast information in other strains are lost. Nation-states are similar in that the ideas and memes of the powerful become dominant and other ideas are muted to the point of loss. The lack of diversity in ideas and approaches also means little to no opportunity to test social solutions. Smaller units of governance means more units of governance which increases diversity and diversity/flexibility of thinking is the source of innovation. Small units of governance are flexible in contrast to the rigidity of large nation-states.
Showing posts with label nuclear power. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclear power. Show all posts
Monday, April 8, 2019
Tuesday, January 2, 2018
Arms 'Marketing'
Short video of William Hartung at TRNN describing how the MIC profits from war and government policy. My comment:
Name of piece: Code Pink Conference: The Arms Industry Hides Behind Euphemisms (December 29, 2017)
William Hartung hit the nail right square on the head. A popular meme spouted by many pro-capitalist economists is that in free markets, market forces (consumer spending/consumption) drives what gets produced. But somehow, these same economists never examine the 'market forces' of the planned military arms economy (created by governments, especially by the U.S. government). The planned military economy creates forces of lobbyists and special interests who advocate for constant war and continuous arms race. Instead of buying food, childcare, medical care, education and intact ecosystem for our children and grandchildren, American taxpayers are buying updated nuclear weapons and other military hardware, war game exercises, ill-will from hundreds of foreign military bases and global instability from waging and fomenting war. These are economic decisions and American voters need to understand the spending priorities of their government in that light.
Another useful tool maybe to redefine what economies are. The word 'economy' has Greek roots meaning house or home. The common definition of economy is focused on production/consumption of consumer goods for the purpose of generating profit, a far cry from house/home. A much better definition would be self-organizing and self-sustaining systems of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services that promote the well-being of all participants. This would automatically make some sectors of the modern economy 'uneconomic' because they do not promote well-being... the entire offensive arms/military industrial sector.
Name of piece: Code Pink Conference: The Arms Industry Hides Behind Euphemisms (December 29, 2017)
Thursday, August 10, 2017
North Korean diplomacy has not failed - yet
To everyone who claims diplomacy has failed... if the goal of diplomacy is to not completely disintegrate the opposing party in a relationship, then diplomacy with NK has worked since the cessation of the Korean War. Although imperfect, a useful metaphor for relationships with foreign countries is that of family relationships which cannot be escaped. Close family members are allies; enemies are contentious ex-spouses/in-laws with whom children are shared. To maintain these relationships, both parties must invest time and effort to communicate. It's much easier with family because there is a higher level of trust; these relationships have a higher tolerance for neglect. The goal of the family relationship is to be up to date with each others lives like keeping up to date on the agenda and goals of allies. To maintain functional relationships with ex-spouses over children (visitation, holidays, privileges, gifts...) for the sake of children may require ongoing negotiation and third party mediators. The ongoing negotiation is the goal of ex-spouse relationship; failure to negotiate can result in abuse and/or crimes of passion. Failure of diplomacy can result in armed conflict and/or nuclear war. It's not fun or flashy but diplomacy *is* the only solution with regards to NK.
Comment at TRNN:
The key statements: "Kim Jong-un is a not a madman... He's very sober, very sane. Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung before him were the same. They have one purpose. Their purpose is to maintain their regime, to continue to be able to drink their Hennessys and their Courvoisier, and to have their women and so forth and so on. That is the sole purpose of the Kim dynasty. It is a very rational purpose, and they're very rational about achieving that purpose."
DJT is also trying to stay in power. He's actually in a decent position: he is POTUS; his party controls all three branches of government; he has money... but he isn't taking rational action to stay in power.
Take NK, the goal of diplomacy between international enemies is to have an active ongoing dialog to achieve mutually satisfactory detente. DJT wants a diplomatic 'win', implying the cessation and dismantling of NK's nuclear program. The NK war hawk's see NK as a mortal enemy who threatens our allies. The only way to completely resolve or 'win' the 'NK = enemy' dynamic is either become friends with them *or* take them out of the equation through armed conflict. Become friends with NK is about as rational as expecting DJT to represent the interests of all Americans, which leaves decimating NK through war as the only route to 'wining'. Considering that war in that region of the world could cost millions of lives and destroy economies, war would not be a rational action. The *only* rational action is diplomacy, even if it does no more than delay mutually assured destruction.
BTW, why are [diplomatic] negotiations with NK viewed as 'winning' or 'losing' when labor/employer and defense/plaintiff negotiations are viewed as 'settlements' or 'contracts'? This is propaganda stirs up support for war and it only benefits the military industrial complex.
Friday, April 3, 2015
The Iran nuclear deal is so bad, it should be applied to the financial industry
There's a framework of a deal with Iran over nuclear weapons. A deal is needed because a nuclear Iran threatens the stability of the Middle East. And there's a lot of rumbling over how bad it is. In fact, it's so bad, the banks which threaten the stability of the economy (in fact, they all but collapsed the economy and have taken serious shots at our cities) should be held to the same standards...
***
[Note: My only contribution to the text below is in red.]
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
(Roughly equivalent terms for financial industry)
Enrichment (sale of Risky Financial Instruments - RFI)
Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge. (reduce RFI sales force)
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. (set limits on sale of RFIs)
Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years. (reduce numbers of RFIs)
All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment. (store excess RFIs in warehouse guarded by regulators)
Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years. (no new financial instruments research arms for 15 years)
Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework. (extend spread risk of likely tanking economy 40 time periods into the future)
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium (convert equivalent fraction of RFI sales force to other purposes)
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years. (converted sales force from above is banned from RFI sales for 15 years)
Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center. (converted sales force from above can only sell safe investments)
Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years. (no new financial instruments research arms for 15 years)
Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years. (converted sales force from above cannot handle or support sales of RFIs for 15 years)
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency (to be overseen by Financial regulators)
The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies. (regulators will have regular access to all commercial facilities)
Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program. (regulators will have regular access to all records and contracted work)
Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance. (access of regulators good for 20 years)
All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure. (establish clean and clear channels of outside contracting/contracts)
Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country. (regulators can inspect other suspicious sites)
Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities. (regulators require early notification of expansion/resumption of RFI research/sales)
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing (Redesign RFIs to be safe financial instruments with reasonable guarantee of return)
Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions (Rescind charter(s) of non-compliant banking and financial institutions; place non-compliant banking and financial institutions under Receivership; restrict access of non-compliant banking and financial institutions to funds from Frederal Reserve)
Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing (agreement is binding for times stated within)
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.
***
[Note: My only contribution to the text below is in red.]
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
(Roughly equivalent terms for financial industry)
Enrichment (sale of Risky Financial Instruments - RFI)
Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge. (reduce RFI sales force)
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. (set limits on sale of RFIs)
Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years. (reduce numbers of RFIs)
All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment. (store excess RFIs in warehouse guarded by regulators)
Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years. (no new financial instruments research arms for 15 years)
Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework. (extend spread risk of likely tanking economy 40 time periods into the future)
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium (convert equivalent fraction of RFI sales force to other purposes)
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years. (converted sales force from above is banned from RFI sales for 15 years)
Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center. (converted sales force from above can only sell safe investments)
Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years. (no new financial instruments research arms for 15 years)
Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years. (converted sales force from above cannot handle or support sales of RFIs for 15 years)
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency (to be overseen by Financial regulators)
The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies. (regulators will have regular access to all commercial facilities)
Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program. (regulators will have regular access to all records and contracted work)
Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance. (access of regulators good for 20 years)
All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure. (establish clean and clear channels of outside contracting/contracts)
Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country. (regulators can inspect other suspicious sites)
Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities. (regulators require early notification of expansion/resumption of RFI research/sales)
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing (Redesign RFIs to be safe financial instruments with reasonable guarantee of return)
Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions (Rescind charter(s) of non-compliant banking and financial institutions; place non-compliant banking and financial institutions under Receivership; restrict access of non-compliant banking and financial institutions to funds from Frederal Reserve)
Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing (agreement is binding for times stated within)
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.
Thursday, October 10, 2013
Two questions about the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster…
Apparently radioactive water is leaking from the holding tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant which was damaged by the March 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami.
-The operators of the plant have proposed building an ‘ice wall’ to contain the contaminated water leaking from the plant… What are the energy needs to establish and maintain/operate this for the necessary length of time? Will it ultimately consume more energy than Fukushima Daiichi ever produced? There are already so many excellent reasons to reject nuclear energy, is this another mark in the no column?
-Would it be possible to clear some of the radioactive isotopes from the contaminated water with activated charcoal? If so, why not dump some in the holding tanks… at least the water that leaks out will be just the slightest bit less radioactive.
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